Ahstract-The method Bayesian Networks (BN) has, in previous literature, been recognized as a powerful tool for safety analysis, with several advantages over traditional methods such as fault trees. The construction of BNs for safety analysis is however cumbersome; no easier than construction of fault trees. The paper therefore presents a systematic method for construction of BNs for safety analysis. It is recognized that a special kind of BNs is required, namely Causal BNs. The basic principle for constructing these Causal BNs is to utilize specifications of requirements, here viewed as services, and their relationships. The approach is especially attractive in the context of safety standards (e.g. IS026262) where specification and traceability of requirements is already mandatory. The framework in the paper also provides a theoretical link between requirements engineering and the dependability theoretical definitions of fault and failure.
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I. IN TRODUCTION
Two of the most common, and traditional, methods for safety analysis are fault tree analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA). Recently Bayesian networks has been proposed as an alternative, e.g. see [3] , [8] . In its construction, there are many similarities to fault trees, and in fact, any fault tree can be mapped into a Bayesian Network (BN) [3] . However, BNs have several important advantages compared to fault trees: the use of probabilistic intermediate nodes instead of only and/or gates, more flexible modeling of dependencies between components, more than two state values of nodes, and the possibility to use powerful computational engines developed for general BN inference.
Even though BNs are powerful, the BN model still needs to be built before safety analysis can be done. The effort may also be greater compared to fault trees, due to the increased modeling power, and thereby a larger amount of modeling choices for the modeler. One option would be to first build a fault tree and then convert it into a BN. However, the first three advantages of using BNs, in the list above, would then be lost. Therefore, to support the engineers, there is a need for a systematic method to construct BN s for safety analysis. A systematic method would also reduce the reliance on personal judgments of the individuals doing the modeling.
With this motivation, the current paper proposes, as the main contribution, a systematic method for construction of BNs for safety analysis. The aim is a method with a minimal amount of manual steps and human input. The chosen approach is therefore to use as inputs, information ':'This work was supported by VINNOVA, Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems 1 M. Nyberg is with Mechatronic Systems Department, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden already available in a standard engineering development environment: the architecture and the requirements. Both these artifacts are also already mandatory in the context of safety standards, such as ISO 26262.
The development of the proposed method starts in a study of some typical safety analyses tasks. An important finding, and a second contribution of the paper, is that standard BNs are in fact not sufficient. Instead so called Causal BNs [11] must be used. With standard BNs, failure causes cannot be correctly identified, and some types of needed inference computations cannot be performed. This is highlighted by showing that computations of important measures [7] result in wrong answer if standard BN s are used.
The method for constructing the BN is based on building a Failure Propagation (FP) graph, which is then shown to be a BN if complemented with probabilities. The FP graph is generated based on the structure of the requirements together with the architecture. This is done using a formal framework where dependability theoretical definitions [1] , [9] of faults/failure are linked to requirements engineering [6] by viewing components as providers of services. The for malization of this link is a third contribution of the paper. The link is fundamental in order to maintain consistency between the dependability and the requirements engineering view of the system. There are other frameworks that formalize both concepts of failures and requirements, see EAST-ADL [10] and AADL [12] . However, none of these frameworks establish the formal link between the two concepts. Without considering this link, a fault in a component may cause a failure but no requirement is violated, or the opposite, the fault causes a requirement to become violated but no failure occurs. These situations are avoided if the proposed link between requirements and failures is maintained. Using this approach a requirements traceability graph [6] becomes closely related to the FP graph and also a fault tree.
The paper is organized as follows. First, Section II, in troduces a realistic industrial example, used throughout the paper to illustrate the approach. Section III then investigates a set of typical safety analyses and their implications on the needed type of BN. Section IV and V present the theoretical framework and the systematic BN construction method re spectively. In Section VI, an example scenario is presented and the proposed method is illustrated together with some typical safety analyses. Finally, Section VII describes some further relations to existing literature. 
II. ILLUSTRATIVE ApPLICATION EXAMPLE AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As an introduction to the problem formulation, and as a running example, we will use a simplified version of a Fuel Level Display (FLD) system. This particular example system is found in trucks from the Swedish truck manufacturer Scania. The purpose of the system is to, using a gauge, inform the driver about the amount, in percentage, of fuel in the fuel tank. The FLD system is safety critical since run-out-of fuel leads to unexpected loss of engine power with implications of loss of steering, and stops in potentially 92 dangerous locations such as in the middle of a highway. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of all components and their connections in the system: fuel tank, fuel level sensor, wires connecting the sensor to the ECU (Electronic Con trol Unit), power supply, ground, AD-converter, low-level input SW converting voltage value to height, application SW converting the height to fuel volume, low-level output SW converting volume to a percentage value, output driver controlling the fuel gauge, wires to the fuel gauge, and the fuel gauge itself. Most of these components are subject to design errors, and all of them are subject to random failures during operation. Fig. 2 shows a corresponding BN for safety analysis made in the BN-tool Genie [4] . Source nodes, one for each com ponent, represent all possible faults in the system, and non source nodes represent failures. Links represent propagation of faults to failures, or failures to failures. Safety of the system can be assessed easily by inference computations using the BN tool, e.g. the overall safety of the system corresponds to the inferred probability of the top node being in the state "Failed". Now, the key problem investigated in this paper is: given a system architecture description, like the one in Fig. I how to arrive in the BN shown in Fig. 2 . We are aiming for a systematic method, meaning that two different persons applying the approach should end up in the same BN. The method should also give a BN that is capable of answering queries related to safety analysis, so called safety queries.
III. PROBABILISTIC FORMULATION OF SAFETY

ANALYSIS
We will below present a set of typical safety queries and for each of them describe how they can be formulated in a probabilistic framework. We also explain how to obtain an answer to each safety query by using the BN. The typical example of a safety query is "how safe is the system?", but there are also other relevant safety queries as we will see. Note also that more comprehensive analyses like FMEA and FTA can be formulated as a set of more simple queries.
Central in several of the queries is the notion of causality. We say that a fault or failure Fe has causal influence on another failure Ft if P(Ftldo(Fc)) > P(Ft), where do(Fc) denotes the intervention that fault Fe is injected in the system such that the implied change is local, and does not spread over to mechanisms other than specified by do(Fc). This definition is in accordance with [11] under the assumption that faults can only increase the probability of failure, not decrease. If Fe has a causal influence on Ft, we also say that Fe is a possible cause of Ft and that Ft is a possible effect of Fe.
Query I (System Safety) How safe is the system?: Safety of a system refers to the absense of a set of identified safety related top-level failures. The identification of these failures is typically done using hazard identification, e.g. as described in IS026262. In terms of probability, a measure of system safety is P(Ft) where Ft is a top-level failure. Provided Ft is represented by a node in a BN, the inference P(Ft) is trivial using a BN-tool. Query III (Component Importance) How important is a specific component with respect to system safety?: For evaluation of the importance of a single component for the overall system safety, reliability, availability, etc., a number of importance measures have been proposed in the literature, for an overview see [7] . Considering the context of safety, the basis of these importance measures is a comparison between the unconditioned system safety and system safety conditioned on a failure or conditioned on no-failure in the specified component. Two of the most commonly used importance measures are RAW (Reliability Achievement Worth) and RRW (Reliability Reduction Worth). These mea sures can be expressed as the specified component. The intention of RAW is to evaluate the maximum increase in system safety consequent to an improvement of the specified component.
In RRW, the intention of denominator P( ,Ft 1Fe) is to quantify the absolute safety resulting from a component failure Fe. However, the precise meaning of the expression P( ,Ft IF e) is the probability of ,Ft when Fe is observed. To capture the intention of the RRW measure, we need instead to use the expression P(,Ftldo(Fc)). The issue is highlighted in the following example.
Example I: Loss of power to the lighting system of a car has the effect that the fa ilure "NoMainLight" becomes present. It also has the effect that the light over the reg istration plate gets the fa ilure "NoRegPlateLight". The top level fa ilure "NoMainLight" is classified as safety critical. To quantify the importance of the component fa ilure "NoReg PlateLight" consider first the expression 1 P( "NoMainLight"ldo( "NoRegPlateLight")) (2) Since the intervention to inject the fa ilure "NoRegPlate Light" will not effect the main light, we have the relationship
where we have also indicated that the rightmost probability is very low, otherwise the system would not be acceptably safe. In this particular example, the dominator and numerator in RRW becomes equal, and the RRW measure becomes equal to J indicating that the system safety is not reduced by the fa ilure "NoRegPlateLight". This corresponds to common sense and is a correct quantification of the importance of the component fa ilure "NoRegPlateLight". Now, instead of using (2), consider the alternative P("NoMainLight"l "NoRegPlateLight") = "not so low" (4) which according to the discussion in the beginning of the example is not so low; observing "NoRegPlateLight" in creases the probability that there is a loss of power present, which in turn would imply an increased probability of "NoMainLight". Using expression (4) in the RRW measure would give the wrong result; the RRW measure becomes larger than I indicating wrongly that system safety would be reduced by the fa ilure "NoRegPlateLight".
In conclusion, when component importance is measured, the expression P(,Ftldo(Fe)) must be used instead of P(,FtlFe). Thus, when using a BN, the ability to compute expressions like P( ,Ft Ido(Fc)) is necessary.
Remark: It can be noted that with the use of the expression P( ,Ft Ido(Fc)), the RRW measure becomes a quantification of amount of causal influence, since, in essence, it becomes (1) an evaluation of the difference between P(Ftldo(Fc)) and
where ,Fi denotes the absence of failure Fi. The intention of RRW is to evaluate how much the overall system safety, formulated as the probability of absence of the top-level safety related failure Ft, is reduced by a failure/fault Fe in
A. Requirements on the Bayesian Network
This section has listed a set of three types of safety queries and formulated them in terms of graph analysis or probabilistic inference in a BN. From this list of queries we can conclude that we need a BN with the following properties: (i) there must be nodes for the faults and failures we want to reason about, including top-level failures; (ii) the network must be causal, i.e. links represent causal influence such that possible causes and effects can be identified; (iii) the BN must correspond to a factorization of the joint probability of all considered faults and failures, otherwise inference will in general not give the correct answer.
IV. FRAMEwORK
This section describes a formal framework with concepts to be used later on in Section V when constructing the BN. Because of space limitation, the description of the framework is limited to systems with a flat structure; an extension to hierarchical systems is possible, but comes with more involved notations.
A. Components and Systems
A component is a set of variables called ports, and is used to model an element of SW or HW. A port can be connected to other ports, by connectors or simply by sharing port variables. Connection by connectors means to add relations such as P I = P 2, expressing that port P I is connected by a connector to port P 2. Although less powerful w.r.t modeling flow, all examples in the paper will use connection by sharing port variables.
A component has a non-empty ordered set of behavioral modes, where each represents a relation, i.e. a set of trajecter ies, defined on its ports. Note that behavioral modes may be overlapping in the sense that one trajectory may belong to two different behavioral modes. One behavioral mode (the first by convention) is always the no-fault mode (also called good or normal mode). The other behavioral modes model faulty behavior.
A system is a set of, possibly connected, components.
B. Services
We also consider relations, on port variables, representing desires from some perspective. In literature, such relations are usually named "requirements", "functions", "services", "capabilities", "promises", or "guarantees". For naming, we will here follow [1] and use the word "service" even though other names may be prefered depending on the tradition in the actual application domain. It is also the experience of the author that in discussions with engineers, the term "service" creates associations corresponding well to the formal definitions presented here.
C. Representation of Behavior and Services
We assume that both services and behavior are represented by formulas over the ports involved in the relation. For instance, if y and U are two ports, an example of a relation 94 is y ::.; u. We also consider so called entailment relations between formulas; for example, we write (5) to denote that the formula y = U entails the formula y ::.; u, i.e. all assignments to y and U that satisfy the y = U will also satisfy y ::.; u. The entailment relation will also be generalized to cases with sets of formulas, on one or both sides of the symbol F.
D. System Design
In Section IV-A, the concept of system was introduced. We will now introduce a richer structure, called system design, in which services are related to components and to each other. Firstly we allow services to be allocated to components. We will assume that each service is allocated to exactly one component. If service 8 is allocated to component e, we say that e is a service provider of service 8.
A service 8e allocated to a component e may have one or several supplier services which are in turn services allocated to other components. We will say that a component el is a supplier to a component e2 if there is a service of el that is a supplier service to a service of e2.
We consider a system design to be a tuple (SY S, S, A, U), where
• SY S is a system, i.e. a set of connected components • S is a set of services, where each service is a relation on the ports in SY S • A C;; S x SY S is an allocation of services to compo nents, such that each service is allocated to exactly one component • U C;; S x S is an association of supplier services to services. We say that a system design is acyclic if the directed graph formed by the supplier service association is acyclic, i.e. contains no cycles. 
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In the considered system design, we assume that the supplier services of the service 8 1 , i.e. ha = h, are 82, 84, and 88.
Further, we assume that the supplier services of the service 88, are 83, 85, 86, and 87. 
E. Properties of Services
Let B N F ( e) be an operator returning the no-fault behavior of component e. We will now introduce three properties of services needed later on to ensure that the constructed BN does not contain redundant links, i.e. the set of parents of each node is minimal (Markovian [11 D.
Definition 1 (Proper Service): Given a design V, a ser vice 8e E 5, allocated to component e, is proper in V if, for its set of supplier services 8 1 , ... 8n, it holds that 8 1 ,82,··· 8n, BNF(e) 1 = 8e· (6)
Given a design V with a proper service 8e E 5 with supplier services 8 1 , ... ,8w a supplier service 8i is critical for 8e if (7) and the behavior B N F (e) is critical for 8e if {8 1 1··· 8n} F= 8e (8) Definition 3 (Direct Supplier Services): Given a design V with a proper service 8e allocated to component e, let U be the set of supplier services of 8e together with the behavior B N F (e). A subset Q � U is direct if there is no non-empty set W of services, where 8e tf. W and WnU = 0, such that W U (U \ Q) F 8e and U F W. Consequently, all supplier services are critical. Lastly, none of the variables in the derivation (9) is contained in any of the other fo rmulas of the services in the system design. Therefore, no set of services used in the derivation can be replaced by any of the other services. This means that all supplier services of 8 1 are direct.
F. Faults and Failures
In previous sections we have used the notions faults and failure without giving a proper definition. With the frame work now in place, we are able to give these notions a formal meaning. Fault and failure have been defined previously in [9] and [1] . The difference is that the definitions given here provides a formal link to services, i.e. requirements. In the definitions, we use a notion of mode assignment that assigns one behavioral mode to each component in a system.
Definition 4 (Internal Fault): Given a mode assignment, a component e has an internal fa ult if its behavioural mode (in the mode assignment) is not the no-fault mode.
Definition 5 (Failure): Consider a design V (5Y 5, 5, A, U). Given a trajectory of values of the port variables in 5Y 5, consistent with some mode assignment, a component e E 5Y 5, with service 8e allocated to it, has a service 8e fa ilure if the formula representing the service 8e is not satisfied.
Definition 6 (External Fault): Consider a design V = (5Y 5, 5, A, U) including a service 8 1 , allocated to a compo nent e1 , with supplier service 82 to 8 1 , where 82 is allocated to component e2. Given a trajectory of values of the port variables in 5Y 5, consistent with some mode assignment, the component e1 has an external fa ult with respect to supplier service 82 if the component e2 has a service 82 failure.
V. CONSTRUC TING THE BAYESIAN NE TWORK
Given an acyclic system design V = (5Y 5, 5, A, U), let the FP (Failure Propagation) graph be the directed graph formed by having:
• one node for each service 8i E 5, • one node for the behavioral mode be of each component e E 5Y5, • an arc (be,8e) for each service 8e allocated to compo nent e, and • an arc (8i 1 8e) if and only if 8i is a supplier service of 8e·
Corresponding to the nodes in the FP graph, we view all 8i and be as discrete random variables. Each service variable 8i takes the value "Nom", if the formula representing the service is satisfied, and "Failed" otherwise. We make the following two assumptions, in which pa G (8i) means the parents of the node 8i in the FP graph. Assumption 1: If a service 8i is proper and its set of supplier services direct, then the local Markov property with respect to the FP graph holds, i.e. it holds that P(8ilpa(8i)) = P(8ilpa(8i), X) for all sets X of non descendents of 8i.
It is possible to manipulate the correspond ing real world system such that a service Si becomes not satisfied, and also such that a certain behavioral mode Tn of a component e can be enforced, and in both cases such that the local Markov property holds W.r.t. the FP graph for all other nodes. A manipulation fulfilling Assumption 2 is denoted dO(8i = Failed), or do(be = Tn) for the behavioral mode Tn.
We will now introduce the concept of causal Bayesian network from [11]:
Definition 7 (Causal Bayesian Network): A directected acyclic graph G is a causal Bayesian network for a set of random variables V if for each X c;: V, it holds that P(vldo(X = x)) admits a factorization according to P(vldo(X = x)) = II P(vilpa c (vi)) (10) i ,villX whenever v is consistent with X = x, where pa c (Vi) refers to parents in G.
The key property of a causal Bayesian network is that links represent causal influence and therefore, any probability P(vl w,do(X = x)) can be computed easily by so called interventional calculus, i.e. incoming links to X are deleted and we then compute P(vl w,x) . Interventional calculus is also commonly supported in BN tools explicitly, e.g. in Genie.
The main result of the paper is now presented as a theorem. The proof utlilizes Assumption I and 2 and can be found in Appendix.
Theorem J: Consider an acyclic system design D, where for each service 8i it holds that
• it is proper, • its set of supplier services is direct, and • each of its supplier services and its behavior is critical. Then the FP graph of D, is a causal Bayesian network for the set of discrete variables, one for each of the services S and one for each of the components in SY S. Furthermore, the set of parents of each node in the FP graph is minimal (Markovian).
D
Example 5: To construct a causal BN fo r the FLD-system we use Theorem 1. The result is seen in Fig. 2 . Inside each node, the upper part contains the name of the service or component, and also the fo rmula representing the service or component behavior respectively. The lower part contains the possible state values and the inferred marginalized probability distribution shown as bars, where the latter is dynamically updated based on given evidence.
Considering applicability of Theorem 1, we need to show that all services are proper with direct and critical supplier services, and also that Assumption 2 holds. We examplify this on the part of the BN in Fig. 2 that is inside the dashed box. This part corresponds to the sensor part of the FLD-system fro m Example 2. Consider the node fo r service 81 (named "Deliver fu el height") having 5 parents. In Example 4, it has already been concluded that 81 is proper with direct and critical supplier services. To show that Assumption 2 holds,
96
we need to find a manipulation of the real world system such that the service 81 becomes not fu lfilled, i.e. ha cJ h while ensuring that the local Markov property holds fo r all other nodes. One such manipulation is to inject a fa ult in the signal between the LL-In SW and the Appl sw.
A. Conditional Probability Ta bles (CPT)
The actual probability values in the CPT associated to each node, is given partly by the framework of the paper. Firstly, for the case all parents are in the "no-fault"/"Nom" state, the probability of failure is 0 due to the relation (6) . Secondly, in cases where not fulfillment of the no-fault behavior of a component, or not fulfillment of a supplier service, logically implies not fulfillment of a service, the probability of failure is 1.
The rest of the CPT probabilities need to be obtained from expert knowledge, experiments, or using standard de fault values. For example, values of fault probabilities in source nodes can be obtained from component suppliers or standards. Regardless of how the values are determined, important for most safety analyses is that every value is not underestimated. That is, if there is any amount of uncertainty of an exact value, the user must find a value that is an upper bound, guaranteeing that the actual probability value is below that bound. Following this rule, it is guaranteed that the safety query I from Section III, results in an upper bound of the actual failure probability.
VI. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
For an illustration of the use of the approach, we here extend the discussion about the FLD system. One service was defined and allocated to each of the components. The approach summarized in Theorem 1 was then used to con struct the BN shown in Fig 2. Probability values in the CPTs were determined using the principles of Section V-A. So called Noisy-Or nodes [4] were utilized to reduce the number of probabilities to enter. Because of the importance of not underestimating the failure probabilities, most probabilities of failure, given a failure of any of the supplier services, were in fact set to one.
Safety query of type I, computed by providing no evidence to the inference engine, resulted in that the safety, i.e. the top level failure probability P(' Xg = V' = Failed) = 9.4e -8. This level of failure probability was considered to be too high, so therefore, the important measure RAW, i.e. safety queries of type III, was utilized to identify the components contributing most to the non-safety of the system. For example, considering the numerator in the RAW, see (1), we have P(' Xg = V' = Failedl' ge = 0' = Good) = Ie -8; the denominator is less relevant since it is constant in this comparative analysis. These queries gave the result that the components contributing mostly to the non-safety were the fuel level sensor, the fuel gauge, the 5 wires, the power supply, and ground.
To improve the safety level of the system, the system was redesigned: a new gauge with increased robustness and with a safe state, an addition of a safety mechanism in the Low Level-In SW detecting electrical failures, a mechanism for fault accommodation utilizing the gauge safe state based on input from the fault detection. This resulted in a new fault mode of the gauge denoted "Off', and three new services related to the fault detection and accommodation. Theorem 1 was used to construct the corresponding new BN. Using this new BN, the total safety was estimated to be P(' Xg = V' = Fa'i/ed) = ge -9, an improvement of a factor 10.
VII. RELATED WORK
So called Assume-Guarantee contracts have been proposed as a mean to structure requirements around components [2] . The concepts of services proposed in this paper is in fact highly compatible with Assume-Guarantee contracts. When composing a set of components with contracts into a system, the guarantees can be viewed as services. If an assumption of one component is satisfied by guarantees of other compo nents, these guarantees become supplier services, and these other components become suppliers.
The literature contains many other approaches to failure propagation modeling, for an overview see [5] . In these approaches, failures and their propagation are explicitly stated in the model, such as in EAST-ADL [10] and AADL [12] . This stands in contrast to the approach proposed in the current paper, where fault propagation is derived implicitly from services, i.e. requirements. If desired, the obtained FP graph can then be translated into e.g. annotations in EAST ADL or AADL. The advantage with the here proposed ap proach is that consistency between requirements and failures is enforced.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In the paper, we have first investigated what type of BN that is needed when the target is safety analysis. The conclusion, and a first contribution, is that Causal BNs are needed. In fact, if standard BNs are used, incorrect results may be obtained, such in the examples of the important measures RAW and RRW. In the framework set up in Section IV, a formal link has been made between services, i.e. requirements, and the dependability theoretical concepts of fault and failure [1] , [9] ; a second contribution of the paper. The main contribution is the constructive method for building causal BN s for safety analysis of real world systems. The method takes as input, an architectural description, such the one in Fig. 1 , and the set of requirements, and produces as output a causal BN, such as the one in Fig. 2 .
